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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ARNELL H. WELCHMAN and EVA
B. WELCHMAN,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.

Case
No. 9160

MERRILL J. WOOD, d/b/a Wood Realty Company, and MILO D. CARTER,
Defendants and Respondents.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This case has once before been before this tribunal.
See Case No. 8718. Respondents again respectfully request
the court to review the brief record to be advised of the fact
situation. Having received all proffered evidence the first
trial court felt moved to say: "There was no real agreement by way of parole-nothing that was not anticipated
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In the written agreement. Plaintiffs have indicated that
there simply was 'puffing' talk". The second trial court
having heard the statement of counsel as to all that would
be attempted to be proved and having heard the testimony
of plaintiff Arnell H. Welchman dismissed the case a second
time for want of a cause of action and explained to the jury
that if all that were claimed by way of proffered evidence
were true he would have to dismiss the action because all
that defendants contracted to do was done and in the testimony most favorable to the plaintiffs there were no further
covenants nor enforceable obligations on the part of · the
defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 8th day of March, 1956, appellants
entered into a Sales Agency Contract with the respondent
MerriU J. Wood Realty Company. Said contract stated in
part: "In consideration of your agreement to list the property described on the reverse side of this contract with the
Multiple Listing Bureau of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board
. . . I hereby grant you . . . the exclusive right to sell or
exchange said property ... if you find a buyer who is ready,
willing and able to buy or exchange said property ... or if
said property is sold or exchanged . . . I agree to pay the
commission recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate
Board ... " See Exhibit D-1.
Appellant Arnell H. Welchman deposes and says that
the house so listed for sale or trade was in fact traded due
to the efforts of respondents. (Dep. pg 6, 7) Appellants
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3
lived in the house that they traded for, ( Dep. pg 7) and
traded the said listed house for the top listing price and
received the equivalent of $SOOO as a down payment. ( Dep.
pg 8, 9) The known and contractual sales commission was
paid ( Dep. pg 11) with no protest and recognizing the same
as a contractual obligation. ( Dep. pg 12) Appellant deposes and says that to his knowledge there never was any
other written contract than the above mentioned Sales
Agency Contract. ( Dep. pg 43)
During the period of time that said contract was being
executed one of the appellants worked in the respondent's
real estate office as a licensed real estate salesman. (Dep.
pg 18-19)
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I
DEFENDANT, MERRILL J. WOOD, D/B/A WOOD REALTY COMPANY, AND DEFENDANT, MILO D. CARTER,
A SALESMAN THEREFORE, FULLY PERFORMED AND
COMPLETED ANY AND ALL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO WITH THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS AS SPECIFIED AND AGREED TO
THEREIN. ( R-6)

II
THERE IS NO PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT THE
ADMITTED CONTRACT WAS ALTERED OR MODIFIED
IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DEVELOP NEW RESPONSIBILITIES UPON THE DEFENDANTS.
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III
THERE IS NO PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT THE
PARTIES ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH
REFERS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ADMITTED CONTRACT BUT WHICH WAS COLLATERAL TO
ITS MAIN PURPOSE INDICATING WITH REASONABLE
CERTAINTY AN INTENTION TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT. OF WARRANTY.
IV
IF THERE WERE ANY EVIDENCE OF A NEW CONTRACT OF WARRANTY SUCH A CONTRACT WOULD
BE UNENFORCEABLE BY WAY OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF
PERFORMANCE.

ARGUMENT
I
DEFENDANT, MERRILL J. WOOD, D/B/A WOOD REALTY COMPANY, AND DEFENDANT, MILO D. CARTER,
A SALESMAN THEREFORE, FULLY PERFORMED AND
COMPLETED ANY AND ALL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO WITH THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFFS
AND DEFENDANTS AS SPECIFIED AND AGREED TO
THEREIN.
Upon the submission of the deposition of the plaintiff
(R-15-26, and entire published deposition), the preliminary statement of counsel outlining all that is hoped to be
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proved concluding with the statement "And then we will
present, to sum it up, Arnell Welchman to sort of reaffirm
everything that we have already presented" (R 14); and
finally upon the trial court's own recorded interogation
(R 27-32) of he who was to "reaffirm everything", defendant Arnell H. Welchman, the trial court held:
"That contract has been consumated, and . . . (the
form) is of no consequence because they actually agreed, and
what the realtor was to do was to bring in a party who would
trade with him, buy or trade. This man and the man brought
in-this plaintiff and the man brought in did agree on a
contract between themselves. The realtor brought them
together, and I take it the realtor would be entitled to his
commission even though these parties got together and
settled on some deal other than the one the realtor was authorized to make for them, and he would be entitled to his fee
because he brought them together. That contract is consumated and is of no importance, and that contract was not
breached." (R 21)
To which statement and interpretation of the court
counsel for appellants replied "That's right". (R 21)
The record thus indicates some evidence that there is
no contest as to the defendant's second affirmative defense.
(R 6)

II
THERE IS NO PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT THE ADMITTED CONTRACT WAS ALTERED OR MODIFIED IN
SUCH A WAY AS TO DEVELOP NEW RESPONSIBILITIES UPON THE DEFENDANTS.
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In support of the notion that a change was wrought
in the admitted contract appellant quotes the word s " assure d"
and "guarantee" as they appear in plaintiff's testimony in the
record. (R 16, 17, 18, 25, 31) Appellant admits in his
brief, page 7, that he doesn't recall the language allegedly
giving rise to these conclusions.
The trial court countered this argument by saying and
ruling " . . . this fellow's (plaintiff) statement where he
says 'He did guarantee to me a certain sum' That's a
conclusion of law. He stated what he thought ... ". (R 20)
These conclusions of law of the plaintiff do not prop·
erly constitute any proffer of evidence of any change. of the
admitted contract.
That the trial court is correct in his above stated reply
is evidenced by the generally accepted restatement of the law
in the case Baker Community Hotel Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant et al, 207 P2nd 1129, 1131, 187 Or. 58, wherein
the court said:
"Conclusions are terms which do not deliniate the
facts; they go no further than to recite the pleader's
reaction to, or the inferences he draws from, undisclosed facts".
We, of course, have no quarrel with appellant's numerous quotes from 12 Am ]ur, Contracts, and certainly agree
with the quotation from page 777
" . . . All contracts must be interpreted with reference
to their subject matter ... "
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7
The only proffered admissable evidence in the instant case
with reference to the subject matter of the contract is Exhibit
D-1 wherein defendant agreed to find a buyer ready, willing
and able to enter into a contract with plaintiffs. Of this the
trial court said: "He did bring the parties . . . he did
bring a man who was ready, willing and able to deal with
the plaintiff. . . . I don't think there is any evidence stated
here that would warrant the court to permit it to go to a
jury or would justify the Supreme Court in holding that-on
the statement made-there would exist a cause of action for
breach of warranty". (R 21)
In the light most favorable to the plaintiff the trial
court affirms point number two when it says: "What was
changed was the mind . . . (of the party) with regard to
the third person. He did say when he told these people to
bring him a man that he would deal with one only for
cash, but he dealt to the contrary, but these, that is, the
plaintiff's did that. These defendant's did bring a man
with whom he dealt ... if he hadn't accepted it, these defendant's wouldn't be entitled to a fee". (R 22)
There is no proffered admissable evidence to the effect
that the original and admitted contract was altered or modified in any way.

III
THERE IS NO PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT THE
PARTIES ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH REFERS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ADMITTED
CONTRACT BUT WHICH WAS COLLATERAL TO ITS
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MAIN PURPOSE INDICATING WITH REASONABLE
CERTAINTY AN INTENTION TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT OF WARRANTY.
Our discussion of point two above wherein it is concluded
that there is no proffered evidence of any alteration or modification of the admitted contract wherein new responsibilities
might devolve upon defendants makes a discussion of this
point unnecessary and repetitious. However, inasmuch as
appellants have chosen to make the trial court's use of the
term "warranty" the basis of their argument in this appeal,
it would seem appropriate to mention it.
"The term 'Warranty' has been defined as meaning
an agreement which refers to the subject matter of
the contract", says 17 C.J.S. pg 795-6, "but which
is collateral to its main purpose ... but the language
employed, when properly interpreted, must indicate
with reasonable certainty, an intention to enter into
a contract of warranty, or sucll intention must be
clearly implied from the language used and the
whole situation of the parties."
Utah Statutes caution us more with reference to warranty in U.C.A., 1953, 60-1-2:
" ... No affirmation of value of goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's
opinion only, shall be considered warranty."
Thus we conclude that if appellants are basing their
cause of action upon the fact that defendants warranted
the value of a uniform real estate contract, or the value of
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a house, or its loan value, taken in payment in the matter of
the exchange of properties, then they must proffer reasonably certain evidence of it. Even then the above statute
indicates such statements may not be construed as warranties.
Plaintiff's answer to the court's query as to what alleged
warranty was made hardly satisfies the demand of "reasonably certain intention to enter into a contract of warranty"
when he replied: "I don't think I can give you the exact
words". The court, even feeling "that all real estate salesmen ought to be kicked in the pants when you can kick them,"
( R 22) could not make a jury question out of an alleged
breach of warranty which alleged warranty arose as testified by the plaintiff and interpreted most favorably to
him: " . . . they said it would go . . _ that they would be able
to make the loan for us, that they had made loans in that area
to houses i.e. they knew of loans that had been made in that
area, and they couldn't see why ours wouldn't go". (R 30)
This action is for breach of a warranty contract, not
misrepresentation or tort. The opinion of the real estate
broker, if any, as to value and the future activity of the
parties does not constitute breach of . warranty.
The court opinioned that in a real estate transaction the
standard to constitute a warranty, if anything, would rise
above the standard to constitute warranty in a sales contract
involving personal property. Greater evidence is usually
required of the sale of real estate and covenants therewith
than the mere sale of personal property. In the testimony
given, the court held that there was no purported warranty
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with reference to what may happen in the future. Appellant, who seeks to overthrow the trial court's decision, does
not cite a single case in his brief to indicate error in said
court's interpretation of the law or the application of it
with reference to real estate.

IV
IF THERE WERE ANY EVIDENCE OF A NEW CONTRACT OF WARRANTY SUCH A CONTRACT WOULD
BE UNENFORCEABLE BY WAY OF IMPOSSIBILITY
OF PERFORMANCE.
Inasmuch as the trial court held that there was no
evidence of any unperformed obligations on the part of the
defendants either as to breach of warranty or otherwise
( R 36-7) this defense was never raised.
It is raised here since under the authority of Burt and
Carlquist Co. v. Marks et al, 53 Ut. 77, 177 P 224 (1918),
some defenses may be waived by failure to assert at each
opportunity.
Plaintiff's plead, but fai~ even to make a proffer of
proof, that defendant's guaranteed that plaintiff's could get
an F. H. A. loan on the property the plaintiff's traded.
Plaintiffs further plead that such a loan was impossible
because of "substantial defect in the foundation of the
house to be financed". (R 2) Plaintiffs thus admit that
the claimed warranty was impossible of performance because
of the law governing the Federal Housing Authority. One
of the most generally accepted rules of contract law is that
nonperformance is excused where performance is rendered
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impossible by the law. In this connection, see Am. Law lnst.
Restatement, Contracts, paragraphs 458, 599, 608. Carnegie Steel Co. v United States, 240 U.S. 156.
One of the conditions implied in a contract is that the
promisor shall not be compelled to perform if performance
is rendered impossible by an act of the law. 12 Am ]ur
pg 955.
The California court in a well reasoned decision in
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal 289, 156 P 458,
held that a thing is impossible in legal contemplation when
it is not practical, and it is impractical when it can only be
done at an excessive or unreasonable cost.
CONCLUSION
Upon the testimony proposed to the court to be entered
and upon the testimony of the plaintiff - interpreted in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff- no cause of action for
breach or warranty or otherwise is made against the defendants. If such warranty were established performance would
be excused as impossible and as impossible by operation of
law. The trial court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
OSCAR W. MC CONKlE, JR.
of the firm of
MC CONKlE & MC CONKlE
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents.
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